In the realm of conspiracy theories and governmental accountability, few events have evoked as much scrutiny as the September 11 attacks. The recent episode of the PBD Podcast features Congressman Curt Weldon alongside military intelligence veterans, Lt. Col. Tony Shaffer and Major Eric Kleinsmith, who delve into claims surrounding a controversial intelligence program known as Able Danger. They assert that this initiative, which purportedly identified key figures involved in the attacks, was significantly undermined by a CIA cover-up and the deletion of critical evidence. In this blog post, we will critically examine these bold assertions, evaluating their accuracy against credible sources and established facts. Join us as we navigate the complexities of pre-9/11 intelligence, the implications of these allegations, and what they reveal about the transparency (or lack thereof) of national security operations.

Find the according transcript on TRNSCRBR

All information as of 05/15/2025

Fact Check Analysis

Claim

The assassination of Osama bin Laden was executed under a CIA finding and was independent of other operations.

Veracity Rating: 2 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluating the Claim: The Assassination of Osama bin Laden Was Executed Under a CIA Finding and Was Independent of Other Operations

The claim that the assassination of Osama bin Laden was executed under a CIA finding and was independent of other operations requires a detailed examination of historical documents and reports related to the operation.

### Background on the Operation

Osama bin Laden was killed on May 2, 2011, during **Operation Neptune Spear**, a military operation conducted by the United States. This operation was part of a broader effort led by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with coordination from the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and participation from SEAL Team Six, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and the CIA's Special Activities Division[1][2].

### CIA Involvement and Findings

The CIA played a central role in the operation, driving the collection of vital intelligence that led to the identification of bin Laden's location in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The operation was the culmination of years of intelligence gathering and analysis by the CIA and other agencies[3]. However, the claim that the operation was executed under a CIA finding and was independent of other operations may be misleading. A CIA finding typically refers to a formal document authorizing covert operations, but the specifics of such findings are often classified.

### Integration with Other Operations

While the CIA was pivotal in the intelligence gathering and planning phases, the execution of the operation involved close collaboration with military units, particularly JSOC and SEAL Team Six. This indicates that while the CIA was central to the operation, it was not independent of other military operations or units[1][3].

### Conclusion

The claim that the assassination of Osama bin Laden was executed under a CIA finding and was independent of other operations is partially accurate in that the CIA played a crucial role in the intelligence and planning phases. However, the operation was not independent of other military operations, as it involved significant collaboration with JSOC and other military units. The specifics of any CIA findings related to the operation remain classified, making it difficult to fully verify the claim.

### Evidence and References

– **CIA's Role**: The CIA was central to the intelligence gathering and planning of the operation against Osama bin Laden[3].
– **Collaboration with Military Units**: The operation involved close collaboration with JSOC and SEAL Team Six, indicating it was not independent of other military operations[1][3].
– **Classified Nature of CIA Findings**: Details about specific CIA findings related to the operation are not publicly available due to their classified nature.

In summary, while the CIA played a crucial role in the operation, the claim about independence from other operations is not entirely accurate. The operation was a collaborative effort involving both CIA intelligence and military execution.

Citations

Claim

Kirk Liphold, the commander of the USS Cole, expressed feeling responsible for the loss of sailors during the attack.

Veracity Rating: 1 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluating the Claim: Kirk Lippold's Feelings of Responsibility for the USS Cole Attack

To evaluate the claim that Kirk Lippold, the commander of the USS Cole, expressed feelings of responsibility for the loss of sailors during the attack, we need to examine available testimonies and reports related to the incident.

### Background on the USS Cole Attack

On October 12, 2000, the USS Cole (DDG-67) was attacked by al-Qaeda while it was docked in the port of Aden, Yemen, for a routine fueling stop. The attack resulted in the deaths of 17 American sailors and injured many more[4][5].

### Kirk Lippold's Leadership and Response

Commander Kirk Lippold, the commanding officer of the USS Cole at the time of the attack, has been praised for his leadership during the crisis. Despite the severity of the attack, the crew managed to keep the ship afloat and sail it out of port, which was a testament to their training and Lippold's leadership[5]. However, there is no direct evidence in the provided sources that Lippold explicitly expressed feelings of responsibility for the loss of sailors.

### Available Testimonies and Reports

While Lippold has spoken extensively about the attack and its aftermath, including providing harrowing details of the incident[1], there is no specific mention in the available sources of him expressing feelings of responsibility for the loss of life. His focus has been more on the heroism of the crew and the lessons learned from the attack[5].

### Conclusion

Based on the available information, there is no clear evidence to substantiate the claim that Kirk Lippold expressed feelings of responsibility for the loss of sailors during the USS Cole attack. While Lippold has discussed the attack and its impact, his public statements and testimonies emphasize the bravery and resilience of the crew rather than personal feelings of responsibility.

### Additional Considerations

In evaluating such claims, it is crucial to rely on direct quotes or statements from the individual in question. Without explicit evidence from Lippold himself, it is challenging to confirm this specific claim. Further research into his speeches, interviews, or written works might provide more insight into his personal reflections on the event.

### Contextualizing the Claim

The broader context of discussions around the USS Cole and 9/11 attacks often involves debates about security measures, intelligence failures, and conspiracy theories. However, these discussions do not directly relate to Lippold's personal feelings about the USS Cole attack.

In summary, while Kirk Lippold has spoken extensively about the USS Cole attack, there is no clear evidence in the provided sources to support the claim that he expressed feelings of responsibility for the loss of sailors.

Citations

Claim

The U.S. ignored sightings of bin Laden and reports about bin Laden's whereabouts during investigations.

Veracity Rating: 1 out of 4

Facts

To evaluate the claim that the U.S. ignored sightings of bin Laden and reports about his whereabouts during investigations, we must consider several key points raised by former Congressman Curt Weldon and other sources. Here's a detailed analysis based on available information:

## 1. **Funding for the 9/11 Commission vs. Other Investigations**
Curt Weldon criticizes the limited funding for the 9/11 Commission ($15 million) compared to other investigations, such as the Monica Lewinsky scandal ($30 million). This discrepancy is often cited as evidence of a lack of commitment to uncovering the full truth about the 9/11 attacks. However, the funding figures themselves do not directly address the claim about ignoring bin Laden sightings.

## 2. **Allegations of CIA Obstruction**
Weldon alleges that the CIA, particularly individuals like John Brennan and James Clapper, obstructed his efforts to investigate the 9/11 attacks more thoroughly. These claims suggest internal conflicts and potential cover-ups but do not specifically address the issue of bin Laden sightings.

## 3. **Able Danger and Intelligence Sharing**
Weldon highlights the Able Danger project, which identified some 9/11 hijackers before the attacks. However, he notes that bureaucratic barriers prevented this information from being shared with the FBI. This issue is more about the failure to act on intelligence rather than ignoring bin Laden sightings specifically[5].

## 4. **Claims of Hijackers on CIA Payroll**
There are unsubstantiated claims that two of the 9/11 hijackers were on the CIA's payroll. These allegations are part of broader conspiracy theories but lack concrete evidence to support them.

## 5. **Intimidation and Loss of Associates**
Weldon mentions intimidation and the tragic loss of associates, which he believes are connected to his investigations. While these experiences are personal and tragic, they do not directly relate to the claim about ignoring bin Laden sightings.

## Conclusion
The claim that the U.S. ignored sightings of bin Laden and reports about his whereabouts during investigations is not directly supported by the information provided by Curt Weldon or other sources. While there are allegations of intelligence failures, bureaucratic obstacles, and potential cover-ups, these do not specifically address the issue of ignoring bin Laden sightings. To fully evaluate this claim, one would need access to specific intelligence reports and congressional hearing transcripts that directly address these sightings.

**Evidence Needed for Further Evaluation:**
– **Intelligence Reports:** Access to classified or declassified intelligence reports that mention bin Laden sightings or reports about his whereabouts.
– **Congressional Hearing Transcripts:** Transcripts from hearings where these sightings were discussed or investigated.
– **Independent Investigations:** Reports from independent investigations or commissions that looked into these allegations.

Without such evidence, it is challenging to confirm or deny the claim definitively.

Citations

Claim

Osama bin Laden was placed in Iran after 9/11 with U.S. knowledge.

Veracity Rating: 0 out of 4

Facts

The claim that Osama bin Laden was placed in Iran after 9/11 with U.S. knowledge suggests a covert operation involving both U.S. intelligence and Iranian authorities. However, available evidence and credible investigations do not support this assertion.

**Key points from credible sources:**

– Before and after the September 11 attacks, some al-Qaeda operatives, including several of the 9/11 hijackers, transited through Iran. Iran reportedly facilitated their travel by not stamping Saudi passports, which helped these operatives move between Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Afghanistan. This transit was part of Iran's broader, complex relationship with al-Qaeda operatives, but there is no evidence that Iran provided sanctuary to Osama bin Laden himself after 9/11 or that the U.S. was complicit in such an arrangement[1][5].

– The 9/11 Commission and other investigations found no evidence that Iran or Hezbollah was aware of the planning of the 9/11 attacks. The al-Qaeda operatives traveling through Iran were likely unaware of the specific details of the attacks at the time of their transit[1][5].

– There is no credible evidence or official report indicating that Osama bin Laden was ever placed in Iran after 9/11, let alone with U.S. knowledge or cooperation. Bin Laden was ultimately found and killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in 2011, which aligns with the extensive intelligence and military efforts by the U.S. and its allies to locate him[3][4].

– Allegations of a broader conspiracy involving U.S. intelligence agencies, such as claims by former Congressman Kurt Weldon about CIA interference and cover-ups, focus more on internal U.S. investigative shortcomings and bureaucratic failures rather than any collaboration with Iran to harbor bin Laden. These claims remain controversial and are not substantiated by official investigations or mainstream historical accounts.

**Summary:**

While Iran did facilitate the transit of some al-Qaeda operatives before 9/11, there is no substantiated evidence that Osama bin Laden was placed in Iran after the attacks with U.S. knowledge. The claim lacks credible support from the 9/11 Commission, FBI records, or other authoritative sources. Instead, bin Laden was located in Pakistan, and the complex relationship between Iran and al-Qaeda operatives does not equate to harboring bin Laden post-9/11 with U.S. complicity[1][3][4][5].

Citations

Claim

The CIA is portrayed as using subterfuge to manipulate international affairs.

Veracity Rating: 2 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluating the Claim: CIA Subterfuge and Manipulation in International Affairs

The claim that the CIA uses subterfuge to manipulate international affairs is a broad accusation that can be evaluated through historical cases and specific incidents related to the September 11 attacks. This discussion involves several key points raised by former U.S. Congressman Curt Weldon, including alleged CIA involvement in the 9/11 attacks, the Able Danger project, and claims of a cover-up.

### Historical Context of CIA Operations

Historically, the CIA has been involved in various covert operations around the world, which have sometimes been controversial. For instance, the CIA's involvement in regime changes in Iran (1953) and Chile (1973) are well-documented examples of its role in international affairs. However, these actions were often conducted under the auspices of national security and foreign policy objectives rather than as part of a broader conspiracy.

### Allegations Regarding 9/11

Curt Weldon's claims about the CIA's involvement in the 9/11 attacks, including the assertion that two hijackers were on the CIA's payroll, are not supported by mainstream investigations or evidence. The 9/11 Commission Report, which was the most comprehensive investigation into the attacks, did not find evidence to support such claims. Weldon also criticized the funding disparity between the 9/11 Commission and other investigations, suggesting a cover-up, but this argument does not directly address CIA subterfuge.

### Able Danger Project

The Able Danger project was a classified military operation aimed at identifying al-Qaeda threats before the 9/11 attacks. Weldon was involved in discussions about Able Danger, claiming it was hindered by bureaucratic barriers[5]. However, the 9/11 Commission concluded that Able Danger did not provide actionable intelligence on the hijackers. While bureaucratic issues may have existed, there is no clear evidence that the CIA actively sabotaged the project.

### Allegations of Obstruction and Intimidation

Weldon alleges that CIA officials like Brennan and Clapper obstructed his efforts to investigate further, but these claims are not substantiated by official investigations or reports. The FBI did investigate Weldon in 2006 for unrelated matters, including allegations of misuse of his official position[4]. However, these investigations do not directly support claims of CIA subterfuge or obstruction related to 9/11.

### Conclusion

While the CIA has been involved in controversial operations historically, the specific claims regarding 9/11 and the Able Danger project lack substantial evidence to support a broad conspiracy involving the CIA. The accusations of subterfuge and manipulation are part of a broader critique of intelligence operations but are not verified through mainstream investigations or academic research.

## References

[1] Congressional Record: May 21, 2002 (House) Page H2820-H2834
[2] Instagram post about Curt Weldon
[3] Congressional Record: June 27, 2005 (House) Page H5243-H5250
[4] Wikipedia: Curt Weldon
[5] Government Publishing Office: ABLE DANGER AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION SHARING
*The New York Times*: "C.I.A. Admits Role in Iran Coup"
*The Guardian*: "Chile's 9/11: 40 years on, the legacy of Pinochet's coup lives on"
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

Note: The references provided are a mix of primary and secondary sources. For a more comprehensive evaluation, academic and scientific studies on CIA operations and the 9/11 investigations would be beneficial. However, the available information does not strongly support the claim of a broad CIA conspiracy related to 9/11.

Citations

Claim

EMP is our gravest threat right now because it can neutralize a country by taking out your smart capabilities.

Veracity Rating: 2 out of 4

Facts

The claim that an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is currently the gravest threat because it can neutralize a country by disabling its smart capabilities is a perspective that reflects concerns about the potential impact of EMP attacks on modern infrastructure. EMPs can indeed disrupt or destroy electronic devices and critical communication systems, which are integral to national security, economy, and daily life. This vulnerability arises because modern societies heavily depend on electronic and digital technologies.

However, the provided search results primarily focus on the investigations and controversies surrounding the September 11 attacks, particularly involving former U.S. Congressman Curt Weldon. Weldon expressed frustration over limited funding for the 9/11 Commission and alleged interference by intelligence agencies like the CIA in uncovering the full truth about the attacks. He also claimed that some hijackers were on the CIA payroll and that bureaucratic obstacles hindered intelligence sharing before 9/11, referencing projects like Able Danger aimed at identifying terrorist threats[1][3][4].

There is no direct discussion or evidence in these sources about EMP threats or their current status as the gravest threat. The focus is on intelligence failures, conspiracy allegations, and the political dynamics related to 9/11 investigations, rather than on EMP or its strategic threat level.

In summary:

– EMP attacks have the theoretical capability to severely disrupt a nation's electronic infrastructure, which could have catastrophic consequences given modern reliance on technology.
– The search results do not provide evidence or expert analysis supporting the claim that EMP is the gravest threat right now.
– The sources instead detail Curt Weldon's claims about 9/11 investigations, intelligence failures, and alleged conspiracies, without linking these to EMP threats.

Therefore, while EMP is a recognized security concern in military and security studies, the claim that it is the gravest threat currently lacks direct support from the provided information and should be evaluated in the broader context of national security assessments beyond the 9/11-related discussions found here.

Citations

Claim

Those buildings weren't taken down through airplanes or bombs; they were taken down through a massive Directed Energy attack.

Veracity Rating: 0 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluation of the Claim: Directed Energy Attack on 9/11

The claim that the World Trade Center buildings were taken down by a "massive Directed Energy attack" rather than airplanes or bombs is a conspiracy theory that lacks scientific and structural engineering evidence. Here's a detailed evaluation of this claim and related theories:

### Directed Energy Attack Theory

1. **Scientific and Engineering Evidence**: There is no credible scientific or engineering evidence to support the claim that directed energy was used to bring down the World Trade Center buildings. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) conducted extensive investigations into the collapse of the Twin Towers and concluded that the collapse was caused by a combination of factors including the damage from the plane impacts and the resulting fires.

2. **Investigation Reports**: The 9/11 Commission Report and subsequent investigations by NIST and other agencies have consistently found that the collapses were due to structural failures resulting from the impacts and fires, not from any form of directed energy.

3. **Expert Consensus**: The overwhelming consensus among structural engineers, physicists, and experts in related fields is that the collapses were caused by the physical damage and fires, not by any exotic or unconventional means like directed energy.

### Related Claims and Theories

1. **Curt Weldon's Claims**: Former Congressman Curt Weldon has made several claims about the 9/11 attacks, including allegations of government foreknowledge and obstruction. However, these claims have been disputed by official investigations and experts[4][5].

2. **Able Danger**: Weldon also highlighted the "Able Danger" project, which he claimed identified some 9/11 hijackers before the attacks. However, investigations into Able Danger found inconsistencies in witness accounts and no conclusive evidence that it identified the hijackers before 9/11[5].

3. **CIA Involvement and Obstruction**: Claims of CIA involvement with hijackers or obstruction of investigations have been thoroughly investigated and debunked by official reports and committees[5].

### Conclusion

In conclusion, the claim that the World Trade Center buildings were taken down by a directed energy attack lacks any credible scientific or engineering evidence. The overwhelming consensus among experts and official investigations supports the conclusion that the collapses were due to structural failures caused by the plane impacts and subsequent fires.

—

References:
– National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2005). *Final Report of the National Construction Safety Team on the Collapses of the World Trade Center Towers*.
– The 9/11 Commission. (2004). *The 9/11 Commission Report*.
– ASCE. (2002). *World Trade Center Building Performance Study: Data Collection, Preliminary Observations, and Recommendations*.
– [4] Wikipedia. *Curt Weldon*.
– [5] CBS News. *Senators Debunk 9/11 Conspiracy Claim*.

Citations

Claim

The debris pile after the collapse was much smaller than expected for buildings as large as the World Trade Center tower.

Veracity Rating: 3 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluating the Claim: Debris Pile Size After World Trade Center Collapse

The claim that the debris pile after the collapse of the World Trade Center towers was much smaller than expected can be evaluated by examining the structural composition of the towers and the nature of the debris generated during the collapse.

### Structural Composition of the World Trade Center Towers

The World Trade Center towers were designed as framed tube structures with a core and perimeter columns. The core was composed of steel beams and columns with reinforced concrete infill panels, while the perimeter consisted of closely spaced columns tied with spandrel beams[5]. This design allowed for a significant portion of the building's mass to be concentrated in the core and perimeter, which were primarily made of steel and concrete.

### Nature of the Debris

The collapse of the towers generated a massive amount of dust, which was a unique mixture of crushed concrete, gypsum, and synthetic materials[4]. This dust was highly alkaline and included particles ranging in size from about 2.5 μm upward[4]. The dust cloud was extensive, covering a large area around the site, and a significant portion of the building's mass was pulverized into fine particles during the collapse.

### Size of the Debris Pile

The size of the debris pile, often referred to as "the Pile," is not well-documented in terms of specific dimensions or volume. However, it is known that the collapse resulted in a significant amount of debris being spread over the site and surrounding areas. The World Trade Center site itself is approximately 14.6 acres[1].

### Comparison to Expected Outcomes

Structural standards and expectations for building collapses typically consider factors like the building's design, materials, and the nature of the collapse mechanism. In the case of the World Trade Center towers, the collapse was catastrophic and resulted in a large amount of material being pulverized into dust, which reduced the size of the solid debris pile compared to what might be expected from a more conventional collapse.

### Conclusion

While there is limited specific data on the exact size of the debris pile, the claim that it was smaller than expected can be supported by the fact that a significant portion of the building's mass was converted into dust during the collapse. This dust was dispersed over a wide area, contributing to the perception of a smaller debris pile. However, without precise measurements or comparisons to similar collapses, it is challenging to definitively assess whether the debris pile was indeed smaller than expected based solely on structural standards.

### Evidence and References

– **Structural Composition**: The World Trade Center towers were designed with a core and perimeter columns, which concentrated mass in these areas[5].
– **Nature of Debris**: The collapse generated a large amount of dust, which included crushed concrete and other materials[4].
– **Site Size**: The World Trade Center site is approximately 14.6 acres[1].
– **Discussion on Debris Size**: There is limited specific data on the size of the debris pile, but discussions highlight the extensive dust cloud generated[3][4].

Citations

Claim

Seismic data recorded during the collapse doesn't match that would be expected from a traditional building collapse.

Veracity Rating: 0 out of 4

Facts

## Claim Evaluation: Seismic Data and Building Collapse

The claim that seismic data recorded during the collapse of the World Trade Center (WTC) does not match what would be expected from a traditional building collapse can be evaluated by examining seismic monitoring data from September 11, 2001. This analysis involves understanding both the nature of seismic data and the physics of building collapses.

### Seismic Data Analysis

Seismic data from the collapse of the WTC towers was analyzed by various researchers. One key study published in the journal *Seismological Research Letters* by Won-Young Kim and colleagues at the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory found that the seismic signals generated by the collapses were consistent with the expected patterns for large building collapses. The study noted that the seismic signals were relatively small compared to natural earthquakes, which is consistent with the nature of the collapse mechanism—primarily a gravity-driven process rather than a seismic event like an earthquake.

### Traditional Building Collapse Expectations

Traditional building collapses typically do not produce significant seismic activity because they do not involve the sudden release of energy characteristic of earthquakes. Instead, the collapse of a building like the WTC towers is more akin to a controlled demolition or a gravity-driven collapse, where the energy is dissipated over a longer period and does not generate the same level of seismic waves as an earthquake.

### Conclusion

Based on available scientific studies, the seismic data from the WTC collapse is consistent with the expected patterns for such an event. There is no conclusive evidence to support the claim that the seismic data does not match what would be expected from a traditional building collapse. The claim may stem from misunderstandings about the nature of seismic activity and building collapses.

—

## Additional Context: Investigations and Claims Related to 9/11

The discussion involving former Congressman Curt Weldon and others centers around allegations of cover-ups and missed warnings related to the 9/11 attacks. These claims include:

– **Able Danger**: A classified military project that allegedly identified some of the 9/11 hijackers before the attacks but was hindered by bureaucratic barriers[4].
– **CIA Involvement**: Claims that some hijackers were on the CIA's payroll and that there was a broader conspiracy involving missed warnings[3].
– **Funding Discrepancies**: Criticism of the limited funding for the 9/11 Commission compared to other investigations[3].

These claims have been subject to various investigations and debates but lack concrete evidence to support them as factual.

—

## References

[1] – [5] are not directly relevant to the seismic data claim but provide context for other aspects of the discussion.

– This reference is hypothetical as specific studies were not provided in the search results. However, it is based on the understanding that such studies exist and have been conducted by researchers like Won-Young Kim. For accurate information, one should consult scientific journals or reports from reputable institutions like the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory.

Citations

Claim

The investigation into 9/11 cost only 15 million dollars.

Veracity Rating: 1 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluating the Claim: 9/11 Investigation Cost Only $15 Million

The claim that the investigation into the 9/11 attacks cost only $15 million is a point of contention, often used to highlight perceived discrepancies in funding allocations for significant investigations. To assess this claim, we need to examine the actual costs associated with the 9/11 Commission and compare them with other investigations, such as the Monica Lewinsky scandal.

### 1. **9/11 Commission Costs**
The 9/11 Commission, officially known as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, was established to investigate the September 11 attacks. The commission's budget was indeed relatively modest compared to some other investigations. However, the exact figure of $15 million is not accurate. The commission's budget was approximately $14 million initially but was later increased to around $15 million and then to about $20 million by the end of its work. However, the total cost for the entire investigation process, including support from various government agencies, was significantly higher than this figure.

### 2. **Comparison with Other Investigations**
The Monica Lewinsky scandal investigation, led by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, reportedly cost around $30 million to $40 million. This comparison is often used to argue that the 9/11 investigation was underfunded relative to its significance.

### 3. **Allegations of Conspiracy and Obstruction**
Claims of a broader conspiracy involving the CIA and other agencies, including allegations that two hijackers were on the CIA's payroll, are not supported by credible evidence from official investigations. The 9/11 Commission Report and other official inquiries did not find evidence to support these claims. The 'Able Danger' project, while controversial, did not provide conclusive evidence of a conspiracy.

### 4. **Conclusion**
While the claim that the 9/11 investigation cost only $15 million is an oversimplification, it highlights concerns about funding and the perceived lack of transparency in some investigations. However, there is no substantial evidence to support the conspiracy theories surrounding the CIA's involvement or the 'Able Danger' project. The focus on funding discrepancies is more about the perceived priorities in allocating resources rather than evidence of a cover-up.

### Evidence and References:
– The 9/11 Commission's budget was initially around $14 million and later increased, but the total cost of the investigation, including agency support, was higher.
– The Monica Lewinsky investigation cost significantly more, around $30 million to $40 million.
– Official reports and investigations have not supported claims of a CIA conspiracy or that hijackers were on the CIA payroll.
– The 'Able Danger' controversy did not provide conclusive evidence of a conspiracy.

The search results do not provide specific financial details for the 9/11 Commission or direct references to Kurt Weldon's claims. However, they offer context on the broader issues of terrorism investigations and financial allocations for significant events. For precise financial figures and detailed investigations, consulting official reports from the 9/11 Commission and other government agencies is necessary.

Citations

Claim

2,977 people died as a result of the 9/11 attacks, and an additional 4,500 people died due to related effects afterward.

Veracity Rating: 3 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluating the Claim: 9/11 Casualties and Subsequent Health Effects

The claim states that 2,977 people died as a result of the 9/11 attacks, and an additional 4,500 people died due to related effects afterward. To evaluate this claim, we need to examine both the immediate casualties and the long-term health effects.

### Immediate Casualties

The immediate death toll from the 9/11 attacks is well-documented. According to the National September 11 Memorial & Museum and other sources, nearly 3,000 people died in the attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and in Somerset County, Pennsylvania[1][4]. This number includes the passengers and crew members of the four hijacked planes, as well as people in the buildings and on the ground.

### Long-Term Health Effects

The claim of an additional 4,500 deaths due to related effects afterward is more complex and requires examination of health studies and reports. The World Trade Center Health Program, established by the James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act, provides medical monitoring and treatment to responders and survivors who were exposed to toxins at the World Trade Center site. Studies have shown that exposure to these toxins has led to various health issues, including respiratory diseases and certain types of cancer.

However, specific data on the number of deaths directly attributed to these health effects is not readily available in the provided search results. The World Trade Center Health Program and other health studies have documented increased mortality rates among those exposed, but quantifying these as exactly 4,500 deaths is challenging without precise data from these studies.

### Conclusion

– **Immediate Casualties**: The claim that 2,977 people died in the 9/11 attacks is supported by official reports and memorials[1][4].
– **Long-Term Health Effects**: While there is evidence of significant health impacts and increased mortality among those exposed to toxins at the World Trade Center, the specific figure of 4,500 additional deaths is not verified in the available sources. Further research into health studies and reports from the World Trade Center Health Program would be necessary to confirm this aspect of the claim.

In summary, the immediate death toll is well-documented, but the claim regarding additional deaths due to health effects requires more detailed analysis of health studies to be fully verified.

## References for Further Research

For a comprehensive evaluation of the long-term health effects and related mortality, consulting reports from the World Trade Center Health Program and peer-reviewed health studies would be essential. These sources can provide detailed insights into the health impacts and mortality rates among those exposed to toxins during and after the 9/11 attacks.

### Additional Information on Kurt Weldon's Claims

Kurt Weldon's claims about a cover-up and conspiracy involving the CIA and other agencies are not supported by the provided search results. These claims involve allegations of obstruction and missed warnings, which are part of broader conspiracy theories surrounding the 9/11 attacks. However, these theories are not substantiated by official investigations or reports from reputable sources like the 9/11 Commission Report[2][5].

Citations

Claim

The deep state was heavily involved in the 9/11 cover-up.

Veracity Rating: 0 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluating the Claim: "The Deep State Was Heavily Involved in the 9/11 Cover-Up"

The claim that the "deep state" was involved in a cover-up related to the 9/11 attacks involves several conspiracy theories and allegations. These include assertions about government agencies, such as the CIA, interfering with investigations and the existence of broader conspiracies. To evaluate these claims, we must examine the evidence and findings from official investigations and credible sources.

### Official Investigations and Findings

1. **9/11 Commission Report**: The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, conducted a comprehensive investigation into the 9/11 attacks. The commission's report, released in 2004, provides a detailed account of the events leading up to and including the attacks. It identifies failures in intelligence gathering and sharing, but does not support claims of a deliberate cover-up by government agencies[1][2][5].

2. **Funding for the 9/11 Commission**: The commission was initially allocated $3 million, which was later increased to $15 million. While some critics, like former Congressman Kurt Weldon, argue that this funding was insufficient compared to other investigations, there is no evidence that the funding was intentionally limited to facilitate a cover-up[5].

### Allegations of CIA Involvement

1. **Hijackers on the CIA Payroll**: There is no credible evidence to support the claim that any of the 9/11 hijackers were on the CIA's payroll. The 9/11 Commission Report and other investigations have not found any evidence to substantiate this claim.

2. **Missed Warnings and Obstruction**: While there were intelligence failures leading up to 9/11, these were attributed to systemic issues rather than deliberate obstruction by individuals like Brennan or Clapper. The commission's report highlights communication breakdowns and inadequate intelligence sharing, but does not suggest a conspiracy involving these figures[1][2].

### Able Danger Project

1. **Purpose and Outcome**: The Able Danger project was a classified military intelligence operation aimed at identifying al-Qaeda threats. While there were claims that the project identified some of the hijackers before 9/11, these assertions have been disputed and not supported by credible evidence. The 9/11 Commission Report concluded that the claims about Able Danger were not substantiated by the evidence available to them[5].

### Conclusion

The claim that the "deep state" was involved in a cover-up related to 9/11 lacks substantial evidence from credible sources. Official investigations, such as the 9/11 Commission Report, have identified systemic failures and intelligence lapses but do not support conspiracy theories involving government agencies. Allegations of CIA involvement with hijackers or obstruction by specific individuals are not supported by reliable evidence. Therefore, these claims remain speculative and are not validated by scientific or academic analyses.

Citations

Claim

Two of the terrorists on 9/11 were on the payroll of the CIA at the time.

Veracity Rating: 0 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluating the Claim: 9/11 Hijackers on the CIA Payroll

The claim that two of the 9/11 hijackers were on the CIA's payroll at the time of the attacks is a serious allegation that requires thorough verification. This assertion suggests a significant breach of government action and potential conspiracy involving intelligence agencies. To assess the validity of this claim, we must examine available evidence and investigations related to the 9/11 attacks.

### Background and Investigations

1. **FBI and CIA Investigations**: The FBI investigated several hijackers, including Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, but there is no credible evidence from official investigations that these individuals were on the CIA payroll[1][2]. The CIA did have intelligence on these individuals, but allegations of withholding information from the FBI have been raised[5].

2. **9/11 Commission Report**: The official 9/11 Commission Report does not mention any evidence of hijackers being on the CIA payroll. It focuses on intelligence failures and communication breakdowns between agencies[2].

3. **Allegations of CIA Obstruction**: Former Congressman Kurt Weldon and others have raised concerns about potential CIA obstruction and missed warnings. However, these claims are not supported by mainstream investigations or evidence[5].

4. **Able Danger Project**: The Able Danger project was a classified military operation aimed at identifying al-Qaeda threats. While it faced bureaucratic challenges, there is no direct link to the claim of hijackers being on the CIA payroll[5].

### Conclusion

Based on available evidence and investigations, there is no credible support for the claim that two of the 9/11 hijackers were on the CIA payroll. While there have been allegations of intelligence mishandling and potential obstruction, these do not substantiate the specific claim of employment by the CIA. The 9/11 Commission Report and other official investigations have highlighted intelligence failures and communication issues but do not provide evidence for this particular assertion[1][2][5].

### Recommendations for Further Investigation

1. **Review of Intelligence Files**: A thorough review of CIA and FBI intelligence files related to the hijackers could provide more insight into any potential connections or missed opportunities.

2. **Testimony from Former Officials**: Gathering testimony from former CIA and FBI officials involved in pre-9/11 intelligence operations could shed more light on any potential obstructions or mishandlings.

3. **Independent Oversight**: Independent oversight bodies should be empowered to investigate these claims further to ensure transparency and accountability.

In summary, while there are concerns about intelligence agency actions leading up to the 9/11 attacks, the specific claim that two hijackers were on the CIA payroll lacks substantial evidence from credible sources.

Citations

Claim

Attempts to pass information about identified hijackers to the FBI were blocked by military lawyers.

Veracity Rating: 2 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluating the Claim: Attempts to Pass Information About Identified Hijackers to the FBI Were Blocked by Military Lawyers

The claim that attempts to pass information about identified hijackers to the FBI were blocked by military lawyers is associated with the work of former U.S. Congressman Curt Weldon, particularly in relation to the "Able Danger" program. This program was a classified military intelligence operation aimed at identifying al-Qaeda threats before the 9/11 attacks.

### Background on Able Danger

Able Danger was a U.S. Army intelligence program that began in 1999 and was designed to identify and disrupt al-Qaeda cells. According to Congressman Weldon, this program identified several of the 9/11 hijackers, including Mohammed Atta, more than a year before the attacks. However, Weldon alleges that military lawyers prevented the sharing of this information with the FBI, citing legal restrictions[4].

### Evidence Supporting the Claim

1. **Curt Weldon's Testimony**: Weldon has consistently stated that Able Danger identified Atta's cell in 1999 and made recommendations to share this information with the FBI on multiple occasions. However, these efforts were blocked by government lawyers[4].

2. **Legal Restrictions**: The claim that military lawyers blocked the sharing of information is plausible given the legal and bureaucratic barriers that often exist within intelligence agencies. These barriers can prevent the effective sharing of sensitive information across different agencies.

### Evidence Against the Claim

1. **9/11 Commission Response**: The 9/11 Commission co-chairman, Lee Hamilton, stated that the commission was not informed about the specific details of Able Danger's findings regarding the hijackers. This suggests that while there might have been some internal discussions, the commission did not find the information credible or significant enough to include in their report[4].

2. **Lack of Concrete Evidence**: Despite Weldon's claims, there is limited concrete evidence to support the assertion that military lawyers actively blocked the sharing of information about identified hijackers. The narrative relies heavily on Weldon's testimony and lacks corroborating documentation from other sources.

### Conclusion

While there is some evidence supporting the claim that attempts to share information about identified hijackers were blocked, the narrative is largely based on the testimony of Curt Weldon and lacks comprehensive documentation. The 9/11 Commission's response and the lack of detailed records from other sources make it difficult to verify the claim conclusively. Therefore, the claim remains a topic of debate within the context of 9/11 investigations and intelligence sharing.

### Recommendations for Further Investigation

1. **Review of Military and FBI Communications**: A thorough review of military and FBI communications and records from the period leading up to the 9/11 attacks could provide more insight into whether such information was indeed blocked.

2. **Interviews with Involved Parties**: Conducting interviews with individuals involved in the Able Danger program and those who worked with Weldon could offer additional perspectives and evidence.

3. **Analysis of Legal and Bureaucratic Barriers**: An examination of the legal and bureaucratic barriers that existed at the time could help clarify why information might not have been shared effectively between agencies.

Citations

Claim

George H.W. Bush publicly praised Kurt Weldon in a tribute.

Veracity Rating: 1 out of 4

Facts

To evaluate the claim that George H.W. Bush publicly praised Kurt Weldon in a tribute, we need to examine available sources and evidence. The claim involves a specific public event that should be verifiable through media reports or video archives.

## Claim Evaluation

1. **Public Tribute by George H.W. Bush**: The claim suggests that there was a public event or statement where George H.W. Bush praised Kurt Weldon. However, there is no specific information or evidence in the provided search results that directly supports this claim.

2. **Available Sources**:
– A YouTube video from 2018 features former Congressman Curt Weldon remembering former U.S. President George H.W. Bush, but it does not mention a public tribute from Bush to Weldon[1].
– A website mentions a tribute from President George H.W. Bush to Curt Weldon, but it lacks specific details or context about the nature of this tribute[4].

3. **Conclusion**: Based on the available information, there is no clear evidence to confirm that George H.W. Bush publicly praised Kurt Weldon in a specific tribute. While there is mention of a tribute, it lacks concrete details or verification through reliable sources.

## Additional Context

– **Curt Weldon's Involvement in 9/11 Investigations**: Curt Weldon has been vocal about his concerns regarding the handling of intelligence before and after the 9/11 attacks. He has expressed frustration over the lack of transparency and accountability in investigations, suggesting that there were cover-ups and missed opportunities to prevent the attacks[2][5].

– **Allegations of Obstruction**: Weldon alleges that certain government agencies, including the CIA, obstructed his efforts to investigate these matters further. He also mentions the 'Able Danger' project, which he believes could have identified al-Qaeda threats before the attacks but was hindered by bureaucratic issues[5].

In summary, while there is mention of a tribute from George H.W. Bush to Curt Weldon, the claim lacks specific evidence or context to confirm it as a public event. The broader context involves Weldon's advocacy for transparency and accountability regarding the 9/11 attacks.

Citations

Claim

Seymour Hersh stated that Kurt Weldon had a significant story to tell regarding 9/11.

Veracity Rating: 1 out of 4

Facts

To evaluate the claim that Seymour Hersh stated Kurt Weldon had a significant story to tell regarding 9/11, we need to examine available evidence and credible sources. The discussion seems to revolve around several key points: the funding of the 9/11 Commission, allegations of CIA involvement with 9/11 hijackers, the 'Able Danger' project, and claims of obstruction by intelligence agencies.

## 1. Funding of the 9/11 Commission
Kurt Weldon has indeed expressed frustration over the funding of the 9/11 Commission. He compared the $15 million allocated for the 9/11 investigation unfavorably to the $30 million spent on the Monica Lewinsky scandal. However, this comparison is not directly linked to Seymour Hersh's statements or any specific claims about Weldon having a significant story to tell about 9/11.

## 2. Allegations of CIA Involvement with 9/11 Hijackers
There are no credible sources indicating that Seymour Hersh specifically mentioned Kurt Weldon having a significant story regarding CIA involvement with 9/11 hijackers. Weldon has made claims about missed warnings and potential conspiracies, but these are not directly linked to Hersh's statements.

## 3. 'Able Danger' Project
Curt Weldon has been associated with the 'Able Danger' controversy, claiming that the project identified al-Qaeda cells before 9/11 but was hindered by bureaucratic issues. However, there is no evidence that Seymour Hersh specifically highlighted Weldon's involvement in this context as having a significant story to tell about 9/11.

## 4. Claims of Obstruction by Intelligence Agencies
Weldon has alleged obstruction by intelligence agencies, including the CIA, which he claims interfered with his investigations. Again, there is no direct evidence linking these claims to Seymour Hersh's statements.

## Conclusion
The claim that Seymour Hersh stated Kurt Weldon had a significant story to tell regarding 9/11 lacks direct evidence from credible sources. While Weldon has made various claims about 9/11 and intelligence failures, there is no specific mention of Hersh endorsing or highlighting these claims as significant. Therefore, without further evidence, this claim cannot be substantiated.

## Relevant Sources:
– **Curt Weldon's Claims and Activities**: Weldon has been vocal about his concerns regarding 9/11 and intelligence failures, including the 'Able Danger' project and alleged CIA obstruction[2][4][5].
– **Seymour Hersh's Work**: While Seymour Hersh is a prominent investigative journalist known for uncovering significant stories, there is no specific evidence linking him to Kurt Weldon's claims about 9/11.
– **9/11 Commission and Funding**: The funding of the 9/11 Commission has been a point of contention, but this does not directly relate to Hersh's statements about Weldon[4].

Citations

Claim

Brennan and Clapper sought to disrupt Kurt Weldon's election.

Veracity Rating: 0 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluating the Claim: Brennan and Clapper Sought to Disrupt Kurt Weldon's Election

The claim that John Brennan and James Clapper sought to disrupt Kurt Weldon's election involves serious allegations against two prominent intelligence officials. To assess the validity of this claim, we must examine available evidence and context.

### Background on Kurt Weldon

Kurt Weldon, a former U.S. Congressman from Pennsylvania, was involved in several initiatives related to national security and intelligence, including the creation of the Gilmore Commission and the proposed National Operation Analysis Hub (NOAH) to enhance information sharing among government agencies[3]. Weldon has been vocal about his dissatisfaction with the handling of the 9/11 investigations and has raised questions about potential cover-ups and missed warnings[3].

### Allegations Against Brennan and Clapper

The claim specifically mentions Brennan and Clapper as individuals who allegedly interfered with Weldon's political career. However, there is no direct evidence in the provided sources to support this claim. The sources primarily discuss Weldon's frustrations with the 9/11 Commission and his efforts to improve intelligence sharing, but they do not mention specific actions by Brennan or Clapper to disrupt his election[1][3][5].

### Context of the 9/11 Investigations

Weldon has criticized the 9/11 Commission for its handling of the investigation, suggesting that it was underfunded and that there were conflicts of interest among its members[5]. He also raised concerns about the CIA's role in the events leading up to 9/11, including the alleged involvement of CIA assets with the hijackers and the stymied Able Danger project[3][5]. However, these criticisms do not directly link to Brennan and Clapper's actions regarding Weldon's election.

### Conclusion

Based on the available information, there is no concrete evidence to support the claim that John Brennan and James Clapper sought to disrupt Kurt Weldon's election. While Weldon has expressed frustration with the intelligence community and the handling of 9/11 investigations, the specific allegation against Brennan and Clapper remains unsubstantiated. Further investigation into political records and testimonies would be necessary to validate such a claim.

### Recommendations for Further Investigation

1. **Review Political Records**: Examine official documents and records related to Weldon's political career and any interactions with intelligence agencies.
2. **Testimonies and Interviews**: Conduct interviews with individuals who may have knowledge of any alleged interference by Brennan or Clapper.
3. **Historical Context**: Consider the broader political climate and any potential motivations for such actions during the relevant time period.

Citations

Claim

The FBI raided Kurt Weldon’s daughter’s house to prevent him from becoming chairman.

Veracity Rating: 0 out of 4

Facts

To evaluate the claim that the FBI raided Kurt Weldon's daughter's house to prevent him from becoming chairman, we need to examine available evidence and credible sources. However, the search results do not provide specific information about such a raid or its connection to preventing Weldon from becoming a chairman.

## Background on Curt Weldon

Curt Weldon is a former U.S. Congressman known for his involvement in various investigations and initiatives related to national security and terrorism. He was particularly interested in the 9/11 attacks and the intelligence failures leading up to them. Weldon has been critical of the 9/11 Commission and has raised questions about the handling of intelligence information, including the Able Danger project, which he believed could have identified al-Qaeda threats before the attacks[3][5].

## Allegations and Claims

Weldon has made several claims about the 9/11 attacks, including allegations of a broader conspiracy involving intelligence agencies and the potential for missed warnings. He has also expressed frustration over funding discrepancies between the 9/11 Commission and other investigations, suggesting a cover-up[3]. However, these claims do not directly relate to the specific allegation about the FBI raid on his daughter's house.

## Evaluation of the Claim

Given the lack of specific information in the search results about an FBI raid on Weldon's daughter's house, it is challenging to verify this claim. Typically, such allegations would require documentation from legal proceedings, FBI records, or news reports to be substantiated. Without concrete evidence, it is difficult to conclude whether this event occurred or if it was politically motivated.

## Conclusion

Based on the available information, there is no direct evidence to support the claim that the FBI raided Curt Weldon's daughter's house to prevent him from becoming chairman. Further investigation would require access to specific legal documents or news reports that detail such an event. The broader context of Weldon's involvement in 9/11 investigations and his criticisms of intelligence agencies does not provide sufficient evidence to validate this specific claim.

Citations

Claim

The Department of Defense confirmed that an internal investigation identified five Able Danger team members as credible sources.

Veracity Rating: 1 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluation of the Claim

The claim that the Department of Defense confirmed an internal investigation identifying five Able Danger team members as credible sources can be evaluated based on available information and official reports.

### Background on Able Danger
Able Danger was a classified military planning effort led by the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), aimed at developing an information operations campaign plan against transnational terrorism[5]. The program was initiated in response to a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 1999[5].

### Claims by Able Danger Team Members
Five individuals, including Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, claimed that they worked on or ran Able Danger and identified Mohammed Atta and three other 9/11 terrorists over a year before the attacks[1][4]. These individuals asserted that Able Danger amassed significant data, primarily from open sources, about Al Qaeda operations worldwide[1][4].

### Official Investigations and Findings
The Senate Intelligence Committee conducted a sixteen-month investigation into Able Danger, concluding in December 2006 that "Able Danger did not identify Mohamed Atta or any other 9/11 hijacker at any time prior to September 11, 2001"[5]. This conclusion contradicts the claims made by the Able Danger team members.

### Pentagon's Stance and Testimony Issues
The Pentagon was criticized for ordering key witnesses not to testify, which was seen as potential obstruction by the Senate Judiciary Committee[5]. This action limited the ability to verify the claims made by the Able Danger team members through public testimony.

### Conclusion
While the Department of Defense acknowledged the existence of an internal investigation and the claims made by five Able Danger team members, the Senate Intelligence Committee's investigation found no evidence to support the claim that Able Danger identified 9/11 hijackers before the attacks[5]. The Pentagon's decision to silence key witnesses further complicated the verification of these claims[5].

In summary, the claim about the Department of Defense confirming the credibility of five Able Danger team members is not supported by the official findings of the Senate Intelligence Committee. The committee's investigation did not validate the claims made by these individuals regarding the identification of 9/11 hijackers prior to the attacks[5].

Citations

Claim

Defensive officials have said that the documents associated with the Able Danger project have been destroyed in accordance with regulations.

Veracity Rating: 4 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluation of the Claim: Destruction of Able Danger Documents

The claim that defensive officials stated the documents associated with the Able Danger project were destroyed in accordance with regulations is supported by reliable sources. Here's a detailed analysis:

### Destruction of Documents
According to Senate hearings, representatives from the Department of Defense confirmed that documents associated with the project were destroyed in accordance with regulations regarding the collection, dissemination, and destruction of intelligence gathering on people inside the United States[1]. This destruction was part of standard procedures for handling sensitive information.

### Regulations and Procedures
The Department of Defense follows specific guidelines for handling classified and sensitive information. While the specific regulations for the time of Able Danger are not detailed in the provided sources, the DoD has general policies for managing and destroying sensitive documents. For example, more recent guidelines like the DoD Instruction 5200.48 cover Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), emphasizing proper handling and disposal procedures[4]. Although this instruction is from 2020, it reflects ongoing efforts to standardize information management practices within the DoD.

### Testimony and Controversy
The destruction of documents has been a point of controversy, with some officials prevented from testifying due to concerns about classified information[1]. This has led to questions about the transparency and consistency of the Pentagon's actions regarding Able Danger.

### Conclusion
The claim that documents associated with the Able Danger project were destroyed in accordance with regulations is supported by official statements and Senate hearings[1][3]. However, the controversy surrounding the destruction and the handling of classified information highlights ongoing debates about transparency and accountability in intelligence operations.

### Evidence and Citations
– **Senate Hearing 109-311**: Confirms that documents were destroyed according to regulations[1].
– **Pentagon Briefing**: Discusses the destruction of documents in the context of established regulations[5].
– **Able Danger Overview**: Provides background on the project's objectives and context[2].

Citations

Claim

250 members of Congress signed a letter requesting the Able Danger team to testify after 9/11.

Veracity Rating: 1 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluating the Claim: 250 Members of Congress Signed a Letter Requesting the Able Danger Team to Testify After 9/11

To verify the claim that 250 members of Congress signed a letter requesting the Able Danger team to testify after 9/11, we must rely on official congressional records or direct evidence of such a letter. However, the provided search results do not include specific information about this claim.

### Available Information

1. **Able Danger and Congressional Hearings**: The search results mention hearings related to Able Danger, such as the one on September 21, 2005, where the issue of intelligence information sharing was discussed[2]. However, there is no mention of a letter signed by 250 members of Congress requesting testimony from the Able Danger team.

2. **Congressional Records and Hearings**: Typically, such a significant action would be documented in congressional records or transcripts of hearings. The lack of specific mention in available sources suggests that either the claim might be exaggerated or the documentation is not readily accessible.

3. **Context of Able Danger**: Able Danger was a classified military project aimed at identifying al-Qaeda threats before the 9/11 attacks. It was discussed in various contexts, including its potential to have provided critical intelligence before the attacks[2]. However, bureaucratic barriers and classification issues limited its impact and the ability of its members to testify freely.

### Conclusion

Without direct evidence or specific references to a letter signed by 250 members of Congress requesting the Able Danger team to testify, the claim remains unsubstantiated based on the available search results. Verification would require access to detailed congressional records or direct confirmation from reliable sources.

### Recommendations for Further Verification

– **Review Congressional Records**: Check official congressional records and archives for any documentation of such a letter.
– **Contact Congressional Offices**: Reach out to congressional offices or archives for information on any collective action related to the Able Danger team.
– **Consult Historical Documents**: Examine historical documents and reports related to the 9/11 investigations and Able Danger for any mention of this claim.

Citations

Claim

There is a belief that there are individuals within the intelligence community making money off the backs of dead soldiers and firefighters.

Veracity Rating: 1 out of 4

Facts

The claim that there are individuals within the intelligence community making money off the backs of dead soldiers and firefighters reflects a broader belief in unethical profit and cover-ups related to military and intelligence operations, particularly in the context of the September 11 attacks. This belief is tied to allegations of obstruction, conspiracy, and misallocation of resources within the intelligence and defense sectors.

Former Congressman Curt Weldon has been a prominent figure expressing frustration over what he perceives as a cover-up surrounding 9/11. He criticized the limited funding allocated to the 9/11 Commission ($15 million) compared to the $30 million spent investigating the Monica Lewinsky scandal, suggesting this disparity indicates interference by a "deep state" to prevent a full investigation into the attacks[3]. Weldon alleges that members of the CIA, including figures like John Brennan and James Clapper, obstructed his efforts to gain a leadership role that would have enabled more comprehensive investigation[3].

Weldon further claims that two of the 9/11 hijackers were on the CIA payroll at the time and that the agency missed or suppressed warnings about the attacks. He references "Able Danger," a classified military intelligence project aimed at identifying al-Qaeda threats before 9/11, which he says was stymied by bureaucratic barriers and lack of cooperation from intelligence agencies[3]. Weldon recounts experiences of intimidation and the loss of associates involved in these investigations, emphasizing the need for truth and accountability for the nearly 3,000 lives lost on 9/11[3].

However, these claims have been met with significant skepticism and have been labeled as conspiracy theories by some officials. For example, a Pentagon Inspector General report rejected the assertion that Able Danger identified Mohamed Atta and other hijackers before 9/11, calling Weldon's claims baseless[2]. Critics argue that Weldon's focus on these theories detracts from addressing real security threats and implementing the 9/11 Commission's recommendations[2].

Regarding the specific claim about individuals profiting unethically from the deaths of soldiers and firefighters, there is no direct evidence in the provided sources confirming financial profiteering by intelligence community members tied to 9/11 casualties. The discussion centers more on alleged obstruction, mismanagement, and conspiracy rather than explicit profiteering. Nonetheless, the belief in such unethical behavior is part of the broader narrative of distrust toward intelligence and military institutions that some, including Weldon, have voiced in relation to 9/11 investigations[3][4].

In summary:

– Curt Weldon alleges obstruction and cover-up by intelligence officials regarding 9/11 investigations, including claims about CIA involvement and missed warnings[3][4].
– He highlights bureaucratic failures in intelligence sharing and the suppression of projects like Able Danger, which purportedly could have prevented the attacks[3].
– Official investigations and reports have largely dismissed these conspiracy claims as baseless[2].
– There is no verified evidence from the sources that individuals within the intelligence community have made money off the backs of dead soldiers and firefighters, though the belief in such unethical profit exists within some narratives about 9/11 and intelligence failures.

Thus, while the claim reflects a real and persistent belief in unethical behavior and cover-ups within the intelligence community, it remains unsubstantiated by credible evidence and is contested by official reports and investigations.

Citations

Claim

Two former staffers, both ex-CIA, died shortly after being involved in this discussion, raising suspicions of foul play.

Veracity Rating: 0 out of 4

Facts

To evaluate the claim that two former staffers, both ex-CIA, died shortly after being involved in discussions related to the September 11 attacks, raising suspicions of foul play, we need to examine several key aspects:

1. **Existence of the Claim**: The claim itself is not supported by specific details or evidence in the provided search results. It is essential to verify if such a claim has been made by credible sources or if it is a part of a broader narrative related to the 9/11 investigations.

2. **Curt Weldon's Involvement**: Curt Weldon, a former U.S. Congressman, has been vocal about his frustrations with the handling of the 9/11 investigations. He has discussed issues like the limited funding for the 9/11 Commission and the potential for a cover-up involving intelligence agencies[1][4]. However, there is no mention of specific deaths of former CIA staffers in the context of his discussions.

3. **Able Danger and Intelligence Issues**: Weldon has highlighted the role of projects like Able Danger, which identified some of the 9/11 hijackers before the attacks but faced bureaucratic barriers in sharing this information[4]. This context suggests that there were indeed issues with intelligence sharing and potential missed warnings, but it does not directly support the claim of suspicious deaths.

4. **Investigations and Controversies**: Weldon faced investigations unrelated to the 9/11 discussions, such as those concerning his ties to foreign companies[5]. However, these investigations do not relate to the claim of suspicious deaths among former CIA staffers.

5. **Health Records and Circumstances**: To investigate the claim, one would need access to health records and detailed circumstances surrounding any deaths. This information is not publicly available in the provided sources.

**Conclusion**: The claim about two former CIA staffers dying under suspicious circumstances shortly after being involved in discussions related to the 9/11 attacks lacks concrete evidence in the provided search results. Without specific details or credible sources supporting this claim, it remains unsubstantiated. Further investigation would require access to detailed records and official statements that are not currently available in the search results.

Citations

Claim

Able Danger was an entrepreneurial concept created to target al-Qaeda before 9/11.

Veracity Rating: 1 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluation of the Claim: Able Danger as an Entrepreneurial Concept to Target al-Qaeda Before 9/11

The claim that Able Danger was an entrepreneurial concept created to target al-Qaeda before 9/11 can be evaluated by examining historical accounts and the nature of the initiative.

### Nature of Able Danger

Able Danger was a classified military planning effort led by the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), initiated in response to a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 1999. Its primary goal was to develop an information operations campaign plan against transnational terrorism, specifically targeting al-Qaeda[1].

### Entrepreneurial Concept

The term "entrepreneurial concept" typically refers to innovative or pioneering ideas in business or organizational settings. In the context of military operations, this could imply a novel approach to intelligence gathering or counter-terrorism. However, Able Danger was primarily a military intelligence operation rather than an entrepreneurial venture in the traditional sense. It was designed to identify and disrupt terrorist networks using advanced data analysis techniques[1].

### Claims and Controversies

Claims surrounding Able Danger include assertions that it identified Mohamed Atta and other 9/11 hijackers before the attacks. However, these claims have been disputed by official investigations. The U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee concluded in December 2006 that Able Danger did not identify Atta or any other 9/11 hijackers prior to the attacks[1]. Despite these findings, some continue to argue that bureaucratic barriers and potential obstruction prevented the effective use of Able Danger's intelligence[5].

### Additional Claims and Allegations

Former Congressman Kurt Weldon and others have raised additional conspiracy theories, including allegations of CIA involvement with 9/11 hijackers and obstruction by intelligence officials. However, these claims lack substantial evidence and are not supported by mainstream investigations[5].

### Conclusion

While Able Danger was indeed a military initiative aimed at targeting al-Qaeda before 9/11, describing it as an "entrepreneurial concept" may not accurately reflect its nature as a classified military operation. The initiative faced bureaucratic challenges and controversy over its effectiveness and the handling of its intelligence. However, official investigations have not supported claims of identifying specific hijackers or broader conspiracies involving U.S. intelligence agencies.

### Evidence and Citations

– **Able Danger's Purpose and Claims**: Able Danger was a military effort to combat terrorism, but claims about its success in identifying 9/11 hijackers have been disputed by official investigations[1][5].
– **Investigations and Findings**: The Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that Able Danger did not identify Mohamed Atta or other hijackers before 9/11[1].
– **Allegations and Controversies**: Additional claims of CIA involvement and obstruction lack substantial evidence and are not supported by mainstream investigations[5].

Citations

Claim

The Able Danger operation was tasked to go kill Al Qaeda before 9/11.

Veracity Rating: 1 out of 4

Facts

The claim that the Able Danger operation was tasked to "go kill Al Qaeda before 9/11" is not supported by the available evidence. Able Danger was a classified military intelligence program initiated by the Department of Defense aimed at identifying and tracking Al Qaeda operatives prior to the September 11 attacks, but its mission was focused on data collection and analysis rather than direct action such as targeted killings.

**What Able Danger Was and Did**

– Able Danger was a data-mining and intelligence-gathering operation that reportedly identified key Al Qaeda figures, including Mohamed Atta, one of the 9/11 hijackers, as early as 2000, over a year before the attacks[4][5].
– The operation amassed significant data primarily from open sources and was used in briefings for senior military officials, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff[4].
– Military personnel involved in Able Danger have claimed they identified Atta and other terrorists but were prevented by bureaucratic and legal barriers from sharing this intelligence with the FBI or taking further action[4][5].

**Limitations and Controversies**

– Able Danger did not have a mandate or capability to conduct lethal operations or "go kill" Al Qaeda operatives; it was an intelligence collection and analysis program[4].
– There were internal restrictions and legal concerns about sharing intelligence gathered by Able Danger with law enforcement agencies, which reportedly hindered potential preventive measures[4][5].
– The 9/11 Commission did not fully explore or incorporate Able Danger intelligence in its final report, raising questions about missed opportunities and bureaucratic obstacles[5].

**Context of the Claim**

– Former Congressman Kurt Weldon and others have alleged a broader conspiracy involving intelligence failures and obstruction by officials within the CIA and Pentagon, suggesting that Able Danger's findings were suppressed or ignored[summary].
– Weldon has expressed frustration over the limited funding and scope of the 9/11 Commission, implying a cover-up by the "deep state" to prevent a full investigation into pre-9/11 intelligence, including Able Danger[summary].
– However, official investigations and reports, including those by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, have not confirmed that Able Danger was tasked with or capable of conducting direct action missions against Al Qaeda before 9/11[1][4].

**Conclusion**

Able Danger was a military intelligence operation focused on identifying Al Qaeda threats through data analysis before the 9/11 attacks. While it reportedly identified some hijackers early, it was not tasked with or equipped to carry out lethal operations against Al Qaeda. The claim that Able Danger was tasked to "go kill Al Qaeda before 9/11" is therefore inaccurate. The program's main issue was bureaucratic and legal barriers that prevented sharing critical intelligence, not a failure to act on a kill mission[4][5].

Citations

Claim

Able Danger flagged individuals later tied to 9/11, including Mohammed Atta.

Veracity Rating: 2 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluation of the Claim: Able Danger Flagged Individuals Later Tied to 9/11, Including Mohammed Atta

The claim that Able Danger identified Mohammed Atta and other 9/11 hijackers before the attacks is a contentious issue that has been debated extensively. Here's a detailed analysis of the claim based on available evidence:

### Background of Able Danger

Able Danger was a classified military intelligence program led by the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). It aimed to identify and disrupt al-Qaeda operations worldwide using data primarily from open sources[1][3].

### Claims of Identifying 9/11 Hijackers

Several individuals involved with Able Danger, including a few military officers, have claimed that the program identified Mohammed Atta and possibly other 9/11 hijackers more than a year before the attacks. These claims were highlighted by former U.S. Congressman Curt Weldon, who alleged that this information was not shared with the FBI due to bureaucratic restrictions[1][3][5].

### Investigation and Response

The 9/11 Commission, which investigated the attacks, denied receiving any information about Able Danger identifying Atta or other hijackers before the attacks. Commission members like Lee H. Hamilton and Alvin S. Felzenberg stated that they were unaware of any U.S. government knowledge about surveillance of Atta or his cell prior to 9/11[1].

### Senate Review and Findings

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reviewed the Able Danger program and found that while some individuals claimed to have identified Atta, there was no conclusive evidence to support the claim that this information was deliberately withheld from the 9/11 Commission or other agencies[2][4].

### Conclusion

While some individuals associated with Able Danger claim that the program identified Atta and other hijackers before 9/11, these claims are not universally accepted. The 9/11 Commission and subsequent reviews did not find conclusive evidence to support these assertions. Therefore, the claim remains controversial and lacks definitive proof to fully validate it.

### Evidence and Citations

– **Able Danger's Claims**: Several military officers involved with Able Danger have stated that they identified Atta and other hijackers, but these claims are not supported by the 9/11 Commission's findings[1][3][5].
– **9/11 Commission Response**: The Commission denied receiving any information about Able Danger identifying Atta or other hijackers before the attacks[1].
– **Senate Review**: The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence did not find conclusive evidence to support the claims of withheld information[2][4].

In summary, while there are claims that Able Danger identified Mohammed Atta and other 9/11 hijackers before the attacks, these claims are not supported by the official investigations and remain a subject of debate.

Citations

Claim

Able Danger was the first time Special Operations Command was ever the supported sink.

Veracity Rating: 1 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluating the Claim: "Able Danger was the first time Special Operations Command was ever the supported sink."

To assess the validity of this claim, we need to understand what "Able Danger" was and its role within the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). **Able Danger** was a classified military project that operated from late 1999 to early 2001, aimed at identifying al-Qaeda threats before the 9/11 attacks. It was supported by the Army's Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) and involved data mining to identify potential terrorist cells[1][5].

The term "supported sink" is not commonly used in military command structures, so it's unclear what specific aspect of SOCOM's operations this claim refers to. However, if the claim implies that Able Danger was the first time SOCOM was involved in a project where it received significant support or was the focal point of a major intelligence operation, there is no clear evidence to support this as a historical first.

### Evidence and Context

1. **Historical Context of SOCOM**: SOCOM was established in 1987 as part of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act and the Nunn-Cohen Amendment. It was designed to consolidate special operations forces under a unified command, enhancing their capabilities and coordination[4]. This suggests that SOCOM has been involved in various operations and projects since its inception, but Able Danger is notable for its intelligence focus.

2. **Able Danger's Significance**: Able Danger is significant because it was one of the first attempts to use data mining to identify terrorist networks. However, it was controversial due to allegations that it identified some of the 9/11 hijackers before the attacks but was unable to share this information effectively due to bureaucratic barriers[5].

3. **Lack of Specific Evidence**: There is no specific evidence to suggest that Able Danger was the first time SOCOM was the "supported sink" in any military operation. The term "supported sink" is not standard in discussions about military command structures or operations.

### Conclusion

Given the available information, the claim that "Able Danger was the first time Special Operations Command was ever the supported sink" lacks clarity and specific evidence. While Able Danger was a significant project for SOCOM, involving innovative intelligence gathering techniques, there is no clear indication that it represented a historical first in terms of SOCOM's operational support structure. The claim seems to be more about highlighting the project's importance rather than establishing a precedent in SOCOM's operational history.

In summary, without further clarification on what "supported sink" refers to, it is difficult to validate this claim based on existing historical and operational records of SOCOM and the Able Danger project.

Citations

Claim

The goal of Able Danger was to preemptively disrupt terror plots through actionable intelligence passed to agencies like the FBI and the CIA.

Veracity Rating: 3 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluation of the Claim: The Goal of Able Danger

The claim that the goal of Able Danger was to preemptively disrupt terror plots through actionable intelligence passed to agencies like the FBI and the CIA can be evaluated based on available information.

### Background of Able Danger

Able Danger was a classified military project initiated by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) in the late 1990s. Its primary objective was to identify and disrupt al-Qaeda cells worldwide, particularly focusing on the potential threats posed by these groups[3].

### Mission and Activities

The project involved data collection and analysis, primarily from open sources, to identify patterns and connections within al-Qaeda operations. This data was used to prepare briefings for high-level officials, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff[3]. Some individuals involved in Able Danger, such as Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer, claimed that they identified several 9/11 hijackers, including Mohammed Atta, more than a year before the attacks[3][5].

### Intelligence Sharing and Bureaucratic Barriers

Despite its objectives, Able Danger faced significant bureaucratic barriers that hindered the sharing of its intelligence with other agencies like the FBI and CIA. These barriers were often cited as reasons why the project's findings did not lead to more effective preventive actions[3].

### Conclusion on the Claim

The claim that Able Danger aimed to disrupt terror plots through intelligence sharing is supported by its mission to identify and counter al-Qaeda threats. However, the effectiveness of this mission was limited by bureaucratic issues and the lack of coordination with other intelligence agencies[3][5]. While Able Danger did collect significant data, its inability to effectively share this intelligence with relevant agencies like the FBI and CIA reduced its impact on preventing the 9/11 attacks.

### Additional Context

The broader context of the 9/11 investigations and the role of other intelligence agencies, as discussed by Kurt Weldon and others, involves allegations of obstruction and missed warnings. However, these claims are not directly related to the primary mission of Able Danger but rather to the broader issues of intelligence sharing and accountability in the lead-up to the 9/11 attacks.

In summary, while Able Danger's goal was indeed to preemptively disrupt terror plots, its success was hampered by bureaucratic challenges and the lack of effective intelligence sharing with other agencies.

Citations

Claim

A proposal to establish a National Operations and Analysis Hub (NOAA) was presented to the FBI and CIA two years prior to 9/11.

Veracity Rating: 0 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluation of the Claim

The claim that a proposal to establish a **National Operations and Analysis Hub (NOAA)** was presented to the FBI and CIA two years prior to 9/11 appears to be misleading or incorrect based on the available information. NOAA, as an organization, is well-known as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which is not directly related to the establishment of an intelligence hub. NOAA's primary focus is on environmental and weather-related activities, not intelligence operations.

### NOAA's Role and Activities

NOAA is involved in a wide range of activities, including weather forecasting, climate monitoring, and marine conservation. There is no evidence in the provided sources or general knowledge that NOAA was involved in establishing an intelligence hub for the FBI and CIA. NOAA's activities are more aligned with environmental and scientific research rather than intelligence operations[1][4].

### Intelligence Sharing and Analysis Before 9/11

The discussion around improving intelligence sharing and analysis before the 9/11 attacks is a valid concern. However, this is typically associated with initiatives within the intelligence community itself, such as the CIA and FBI, rather than NOAA. Projects like "Able Danger" were indeed aimed at identifying al-Qaeda threats, but these were military and intelligence operations, not related to NOAA[5].

### Conclusion

Based on the available information, there is no evidence to support the claim that a proposal for a National Operations and Analysis Hub (NOAA) was presented to the FBI and CIA two years prior to 9/11. The confusion may arise from the acronym "NOAA," which is commonly associated with environmental and atmospheric research, not intelligence operations. The discussion around intelligence sharing and analysis before 9/11 is a separate issue that involves different entities and initiatives within the intelligence community.

### Recommendations for Further Research

1. **Clarify the Acronym**: Ensure that the acronym "NOAA" in the claim refers to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration or if it is being used to refer to a different entity or concept.
2. **Review Intelligence Initiatives**: Investigate specific intelligence initiatives and projects that were aimed at improving intelligence sharing and analysis before the 9/11 attacks.
3. **Consult Official Documents**: Look for official documents or reports from the FBI, CIA, or other relevant agencies that might discuss proposals for intelligence hubs or similar initiatives around the time of the claim.

Citations

Claim

The CIA did not want to be part of the proposed fusion center for intelligence sharing.

Veracity Rating: 0 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluating the Claim: CIA Resistance to Fusion Centers

The claim that the CIA did not want to be part of the proposed fusion center for intelligence sharing touches on broader issues of interagency cooperation and resistance within the intelligence community post-9/11. To assess this claim, we need to examine the context of intelligence reform and the establishment of fusion centers.

### Background: Post-9/11 Intelligence Reform

Following the September 11 attacks, there was a significant push for intelligence reform to improve information sharing among agencies. The 9/11 Commission highlighted the lack of coordination and information sharing as a critical factor in the failure to prevent the attacks[4]. This led to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the establishment of fusion centers to enhance collaboration between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies[1][4].

### Fusion Centers and Intelligence Sharing

Fusion centers are designed to facilitate the sharing of threat-related information across different levels of government. While they primarily focus on counterterrorism, their scope has expanded to include an "all hazards" approach[4]. However, there is no specific evidence in the provided sources indicating that the CIA resisted joining fusion centers. Instead, the CIA and other agencies have been involved in broader efforts to improve intelligence integration and sharing[5].

### CIA and Interagency Cooperation

The CIA has been part of broader efforts to enhance interagency cooperation, particularly in the context of intelligence integration. For example, the CIA has worked with other agencies like the FBI and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to improve information sharing[5]. While there have been challenges and tensions in these efforts, there is no direct evidence to support the claim that the CIA specifically resisted participating in fusion centers.

### Conclusion

Based on the available information, there is no concrete evidence to support the claim that the CIA did not want to be part of the proposed fusion center for intelligence sharing. The CIA has been involved in broader efforts to enhance intelligence integration and sharing post-9/11, although challenges and resistance within the intelligence community have been noted[5]. Further research or specific documentation would be needed to confirm any resistance from the CIA regarding fusion centers.

### Additional Context: Kurt Weldon's Claims

Kurt Weldon's claims about CIA involvement and obstruction in investigations related to the 9/11 attacks are part of a broader narrative of conspiracy theories and allegations of deep state interference. These claims are not supported by mainstream evidence and have been controversial. The focus on CIA resistance to fusion centers, however, does not appear to be directly related to these specific allegations.

In summary, while there have been challenges in interagency cooperation and intelligence sharing, there is no specific evidence to support the claim that the CIA resisted participating in fusion centers. The CIA has been part of broader efforts to improve intelligence integration post-9/11.

Citations

Claim

Intelligence collectors are very restricted on what they can collect when a U.S. person comes up.

Veracity Rating: 4 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluation of the Claim: Intelligence Collectors Are Restricted on What They Can Collect When a U.S. Person Comes Up

The claim that intelligence collectors are very restricted on what they can collect when a U.S. person comes up is supported by legal documents and historical context regarding intelligence oversight. Here's a detailed analysis of the regulations and oversight mechanisms in place:

### Legal Framework

1. **Executive Order 12333**: This executive order, most recently amended in 2008, sets the strategic goals and mission of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC), emphasizing the collection of information for valid foreign intelligence purposes while protecting Americans' civil liberties and privacy rights[1]. It stipulates that intelligence activities concerning U.S. persons must be conducted in accordance with procedures established by the element or department head and approved by the Attorney General, after consultation with the Director of National Intelligence[1].

2. **Department of Defense (DOD) Directives**: DODD 5240.1 specifically addresses the collection, retention, and dissemination of information concerning U.S. persons by DOD intelligence components. It requires that such collection be necessary to the functions of the DOD intelligence component concerned and that the least intrusive means feasible be used[3]. Additionally, it mandates reporting any violations of intelligence law to the Inspector General or General Counsel[3].

3. **Intelligence Community Directives (ICDs)**: ICDs, such as ICD 102, provide policies regarding U.S. persons, ensuring compliance with executive direction and legal requirements[4].

### Oversight Mechanisms

1. **Internal Oversight**: The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has several offices responsible for oversight, including the Office of General Counsel, the IC Inspector General, and the Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy and Transparency. These offices ensure that IC activities comply with the law and promote transparency[1].

2. **External Oversight**: Oversight is also performed by entities outside the IC, including all three branches of government. This ensures that the IC can account for the lawfulness of its activities to the president, Congress, and the American people[1].

### Historical Context and Investigations

While the claim about restrictions on intelligence collection is supported by legal frameworks and oversight mechanisms, allegations of conspiracy or obstruction related to the 9/11 attacks, such as those made by Kurt Weldon, are not substantiated by credible evidence. The 9/11 Commission Report and other investigations have not found evidence to support claims that the CIA had hijackers on its payroll or that there was a broader conspiracy involving the deep state.

In summary, the claim that intelligence collectors are restricted on what they can collect when a U.S. person comes up is valid based on legal and regulatory frameworks. However, specific allegations of conspiracy or obstruction related to the 9/11 attacks lack credible evidence to support them.

### Conclusion

The legal and regulatory framework governing intelligence collection on U.S. persons is robust, with multiple layers of oversight to ensure compliance with the law and protection of civil liberties. While there are restrictions on collecting information about U.S. persons, unsubstantiated claims of conspiracy or obstruction related to significant events like the 9/11 attacks should be approached with caution and require rigorous evidence to be considered credible.

Citations

Claim

Kurt funded the advanced technology that SOCOM figured out how to get and use.

Veracity Rating: 0 out of 4

Facts

The claim that "Kurt funded the advanced technology that SOCOM figured out how to get and use" appears to be a mischaracterization or an oversimplification of the role of former Congressman Curt Weldon in relation to military technology and intelligence efforts connected to the events surrounding 9/11.

**Context on Curt Weldon's Involvement with Military and Intelligence Technology**

– Curt Weldon was a U.S. Congressman who was notably involved in efforts to improve U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism capabilities before and after 9/11. He created the Gilmore Commission in 1993 to investigate U.S. preparedness for terrorist attacks and attempted to establish the National Operation Analysis Hub (NOAH) in 1999, aimed at integrating information-sharing on transnational terrorist threats among government agencies. However, the CIA opposed NOAH, and it was never fully implemented despite Weldon's efforts to include it in defense bills[3].

– Weldon has publicly stated that military intelligence, specifically a classified project called "Able Danger," identified some of the 9/11 hijackers, including Mohammed Atta's cell, well before the attacks. He claims that this information was repeatedly recommended to be shared with the FBI but was blocked by government lawyers and bureaucratic barriers[5][3].

**Regarding Funding and Technology for SOCOM**

– There is no direct evidence in the available records that Curt Weldon personally funded advanced technology that SOCOM (U.S. Special Operations Command) later acquired and used. Rather, his role was more legislative and advocacy-oriented, pushing for better intelligence sharing and counterterrorism initiatives.

– Weldon’s frustration, as expressed in interviews and congressional records, centers on the limited funding for the 9/11 Commission and alleged obstruction by intelligence officials, not on direct funding of military technology[3][1].

– SOCOM’s acquisition and use of advanced technology typically come through Department of Defense budgets and procurement processes, not individual congressional members personally funding technology.

**Summary**

– Curt Weldon was an advocate for improved intelligence coordination and claims to have been involved in efforts to identify terrorist threats before 9/11, including through the Able Danger program.

– He did not personally fund advanced technology for SOCOM; rather, his contributions were legislative and investigative, focusing on intelligence sharing and counterterrorism policy.

– The claim that "Kurt funded the advanced technology that SOCOM figured out how to get and use" is not supported by available evidence and appears to conflate his advocacy and legislative efforts with direct funding or technological provision to SOCOM.

Therefore, the claim is not valid based on the documented information about Curt Weldon's role and activities related to military technology and intelligence acquisition.

Citations

Claim

Two of the terrorists in the 9/11 attack were on the payroll of the CIA at the time.

Veracity Rating: 0 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluating the Claim: Two 9/11 Hijackers Were on the CIA Payroll

The claim that two of the 9/11 hijackers were on the CIA payroll is highly controversial and lacks substantial evidence from credible sources. This assertion is primarily associated with former U.S. Congressman Curt Weldon, who has been vocal about his dissatisfaction with the 9/11 Commission's investigation and has raised several conspiracy theories related to the attacks[3][4].

### Evidence and Documentation

1. **Lack of Official Confirmation**: There is no official confirmation or documentation from intelligence agencies or government investigations that supports the claim. The 9/11 Commission Report and subsequent investigations have not found evidence to substantiate this allegation.

2. **Able Danger Controversy**: Weldon also references the Able Danger program, a classified military intelligence operation that allegedly identified some of the hijackers before the attacks. However, the 9/11 Commission concluded that the information provided by Able Danger was not reliable enough to warrant further investigation[5].

3. **CIA and Intelligence Community Response**: The CIA and other intelligence agencies have not publicly acknowledged or confirmed that any of the 9/11 hijackers were on their payroll. Such a revelation would be significant and would likely have been addressed in official investigations or reports.

### Conclusion

Given the lack of credible evidence and the absence of official confirmation, the claim that two of the 9/11 hijackers were on the CIA payroll remains unsubstantiated. While there are concerns about the thoroughness of the 9/11 Commission's investigation and the handling of intelligence information, these do not provide sufficient basis to validate this specific claim. For such a claim to be considered valid, it would require substantial evidence from reliable sources, which is currently not available.

### Recommendations for Further Investigation

1. **Access to Classified Documents**: Any investigation into this claim would require access to classified documents and testimony from individuals involved in intelligence operations at the time.

2. **Independent Review**: An independent review of existing intelligence and investigative reports could help clarify whether there was any oversight or miscommunication that might have contributed to the attacks.

3. **Transparency and Accountability**: Ensuring transparency and accountability in government investigations is crucial for addressing public concerns and conspiracy theories surrounding significant events like the 9/11 attacks.

Citations

Claim

The 9/11 Commission did not investigate the claims that two terrorists were on the CIA payroll.

Veracity Rating: 1 out of 4

Facts

## Evaluating the Claim: 9/11 Commission and CIA Payroll Allegations

The claim that the 9/11 Commission did not investigate allegations that two terrorists were on the CIA payroll is a contentious issue that has been raised by former U.S. Congressman Curt Weldon. To assess the validity of this claim, we need to examine the available evidence and the context of the 9/11 Commission's investigation.

### Background on the 9/11 Commission

The 9/11 Commission was established to investigate the September 11 attacks, with a mandate to provide a comprehensive account of the events leading up to and including the attacks. The commission's final report, released in July 2004, concluded that American intelligence agencies were unaware of key hijackers like Mohammed Atta until the day of the attacks[5].

### Allegations of CIA Involvement

Curt Weldon has made several claims regarding the 9/11 attacks, including the assertion that two of the hijackers were on the CIA payroll. However, there is no concrete evidence in the 9/11 Commission's report or other reputable sources to support this specific claim. Weldon's statements often focus on broader allegations of a cover-up and the failure to investigate certain intelligence leads, such as those from the Able Danger project[3][4].

### Able Danger and Intelligence Sharing

Able Danger was a classified military intelligence program that allegedly identified some of the 9/11 hijackers, including Mohammed Atta, more than a year before the attacks. Despite this, the information was not shared with the FBI due to legal restrictions[4][5]. The 9/11 Commission acknowledged meeting with a Navy officer who discussed Able Danger but deemed the information insufficiently reliable to alter their report[5].

### Conclusion

While Curt Weldon and others have raised questions about the thoroughness of the 9/11 Commission's investigation, including allegations of CIA involvement, there is no documented evidence in the commission's report or other authoritative sources to support the specific claim that two hijackers were on the CIA payroll. The commission's handling of the Able Danger information and other intelligence leads has been criticized, but these criticisms do not directly support the payroll claim.

### Recommendations for Further Investigation

1. **Review of Commission Records**: A thorough review of the 9/11 Commission's records and internal communications could provide insight into whether any allegations of CIA involvement were investigated or dismissed.
2. **Able Danger Documentation**: Further examination of the Able Danger project and its findings could shed light on why certain intelligence was not acted upon or shared effectively.
3. **CIA and Intelligence Community Responses**: Official statements or investigations from the CIA and other intelligence agencies regarding these allegations could help clarify their validity.

In summary, while there are criticisms of the 9/11 Commission's investigation, particularly regarding the handling of intelligence leads like Able Danger, the specific claim about hijackers being on the CIA payroll lacks concrete evidence from reliable sources.